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Abstract 
 The paper consists in an empirical analysis of the separate as well as joint 
impacts on total and youth unemployment of indicators of labour market policies, 
on the one hand, and the financial crisis associated with the "Great Recession", 
on the other. In particular, we investigate labour market data in the past two 
decades for the Enlarged Europe and we adopt a variable accounting for the 
idiosyncratic-severity shock of the crisis. This time-varying and country-specific 
crisis variable enables us to test empirically and in a novel way the joint impact 
of labour market policies and the economic crisis on labour market dynamics 
even when accounting for common macro shocks.  
JEL Classification: J65, O52, C23 
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 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the EACES-ETUI Workshop on 
"Comparative Perspectives on the European Labour Markets" (7 March 2014, Brussels) and 
accepted for presentation at the 13th EACES biannual Conference (September 4-6 2014, 
Budapest). We thank for their useful comments an anonymous referee, Saul Estrin and Maria 
Luigia Segnana; the usual disclaimer applies.  
1. Introduction and Motivation  
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 A large body of literature investigates the impact of labour market 
institutions and policies, such as active and passive labour market policies, on 
unemployment. Moreover, a growing number of scholars have more recently 
focused on the impact of economic and financial crises on labour market 
dynamics in general. However, there are still few studies that address the 
question of the complex joint impact on unemployment of both labour market 
policies and the financial and economic crisis occurring during the "Great 
Recession".  
Our empirical analysis and econometrics exercise seek to determine the 
role of labour market policies in shaping the relation between the financial and 
economic crisis and (total and youth) unemployment. To this end, we calculate 
the effect of the last crisis on unemployment for different types and levels of 
labour market policies, and we also consider the interaction among proxies for 
the crisis and labour market policies. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two provides an extensive 
literature review on the determinants of unemployment, as well as on the 
relationship between (youth) unemployment, on the one hand, and labour market 
policies and financial crises on the other. Section three presents our testable 
hypotheses and empirical strategy. Section four describes the data and provides 
details on the calculations of labour market policy indicators, as well as of the 
severity of the last economic and  financial crisis. Section five develops the 
empirical analysis and sets out the empirical model’s results by looking at a 
longitudinal panel of 30 European countries in the past two decades. Finally, 
section six concludes with some policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 There is a huge body of theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of total and youth unemployment differences across countries and 
regions, and their dynamics. The best-known unemployment determinants are 
related to general macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP growth and 
productivity dynamics, according to Okun's law (see Lee, 2000; Solow, 2000; and 
IMF, 2010; for empirical applications). In this section, we concentrate on more 
specific unemployment determinants of crucial interest for this paper, namely: (i) 
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institutions and policies, (ii) institutions and shocks, (iii) the impact of the past 
and the most recent economic and financial crisis.  
  
2.1. Labour Institutions and Policies 
 Since the seminal OECD Jobs Study (1994), the so-called "Eurosclerosis" 
phenomenon – defined as the weak employment performance of Europe – has 
been related to institutional variables. According to the institutional economics 
tradition, the labour market (and market only) institutions comprise: labour 
taxes, unemployment benefits (amount, duration, and the replacement ratio) as 
key indicators of so-called passive labour market policies, the degree of 
unionisation (union density and union coverage), the structure of collective 
bargaining (degree of coordination and/or centralisation), Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL), the incidence of temporary and part-time contracts, active 
labour market policies (ALMP), the liberalisation of product markets, housing 
policies, and many other factors besides.1  
Among the empirical works in this field, the OECD report (2006) 
highlights the statistical significance of tax wedges in explaining high 
unemployment rates together with generous (unemployment) benefit systems 
and stringent (anti-competitive) product market regulations,2 while the degree of 
coordination in collective bargaining appears to improve labour market 
performance.  As far as the EPL is concerned (e.g. tight firing regulations in 
Southern European countries), the available evidence is mixed, although the 
majority of studies find a positive relation between EPL and the unemployment 
rate (e.g. Heckman and Pagés, 2003). Turning to product market regulations, 
“economic freedom” affects the labour market favourably both by improving the 
functioning of such markets (direct effect) and by stimulating economic growth 
(indirect effect).3  
                                                 
1
 Nickell (1997) proposes measures for eight "labour market institutions" and he finds that in general high 
unemployment is associated with welfare systems that do not put pressure on the unemployed to search for and 
accept work offers, with high taxes on labour  and also with no co-ordination in wage bargaining. The key role 
of ALMP, together with unemployment benefits, in explanation of changes in employment and unemployment 
rates is confirmed by the estimations of Destefanis and Mastromatteo (2010), while Betcherman et al. (2004) 
observe that only some active labour market policies have a positive impact on labour market performance. As 
for investigations at both national and regional levels in the European context, see Perugini and Signorelli 
(1994 and 1997). 
2
 Hence, product market reforms can reduce unemployment rates (Fiori et al., 2008). 
3
 In some empirical studies, an “index of the economic freedom of the world” has been used (Feldmann, 2010), 
but more particular “freedoms” have additionally been investigated: the size of the government, the rule of law 
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More generally, changes in policies and institutions, together with changes 
in the output gap, are estimated to explain 74% of the cross-country variance in 
the unemployment changes observed for the period 1982-2003 (OECD, 2006). 
Finally, several authors have investigated the key role of differences in "welfare 
systems" for labour market performance (e.g. Boeri, 2002; Bruno and Rovelli, 
2010; Esping-Andersen, 1996 and 1999).4 In particular, Bruno and Rovelli (2010) 
find that higher employment rates are positively associated with active labour 
market policies and negatively with institutions and policies determining rigidity 
in the labour market; they also find that the relation between Active Labour 
Market Policies (i.e. ALMP) and employment levels is non-monotonic and that it 
is conditional on the informal institutions of the different countries. 
 
2.2. Institutions and Shocks  
 There is an innovative literature on the interaction between institutions 
and shocks. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) highlight the fact that adverse shocks 
can explain the general increase in unemployment in the European context vis-à-
vis the United States, while differences in institutions can explain differences in 
performance across European countries. According to these authors, labour 
market institutions can shape the effects of shocks by affecting their impact on 
unemployment and by affecting the persistence of unemployment precisely in 
response to shocks.5 For example, if institutions filter the effect that higher 
unemployment can exert on the labour market by reducing wages, they will 
increase the persistence of unemployment in response to shocks (see also Layard 
and Nickell, 1987). Sargent and Ljundqvist (1995) investigated the effect of 
unemployment insurance rules on the relationship between shocks (turbulence) 
and equilibrium unemployment. Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) analysed the 
effect of unemployment insurance and EPL on the relationship between relative 
demand shifts and equilibrium unemployment. Finally, not only is the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                        
and security of property rights, the liberalisation of international trade, and flexible regulations. Moreover, such 
reforms are mutually reinforcing, justifying comprehensive reform programmes rather than separate labour 
market reforms, and they may interact with macroeconomic conditions and shocks (see next sub-section). 
Brandt et al. (2005) used a synthetic index of the intensity of “reform policies” and found that OECD-inspired 
reforms improve labour-market performance with a five-year lag (see also Bassanini and Duval, 2006), 
signalling the medium to long run effects of such reforms. 
4 As for the transition economies, see Bruno (2006). 
5Blanchard and Summers (1987) shown that, while the permanent effect of shocks is unlikely, institutions can 
lead to high persistence. 
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macroeconomic shocks amplified by the existence of certain policies and 
institutions, but the persistence of the shocks is increased because of long-run 
effects on labour demand (Marelli et al., 2013).  
 
2.3. Past and Most Recent Financial Crises 
 A growing number of studies have tried to estimate the effects on total and 
youth unemployment of the last financial crisis and the so-called “Great 
Recession” (for example, Brada and Signorelli, 2012; Furceri and Mourougane, 
2009; World Bank, 2010; ILO, 2010 and 2012; O’Higgins, 2012; Marelli, Patuelli 
and Signorelli, 2012, Boeri et al, 2013)6.   
Following the recent review by Boeri et al. (2013), the literature envisages 
a number of links between financial and labour markets: the risk adjustment 
effect (Hart, 1983; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987); the quasi-fixed investment 
effect of labour demand (Oi, 1962; Farmer, 1985); the stickiness of the bank-
borrower relationship in the presence of asymmetric information (Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997; Wasmer and Weil, 2004); the relationship between firm leverage 
and labour market flexibility (Monacelli et al, 2011 among many others) and, 
finally, the link between financial frictions and search-based unemployment in 
the event of a financial shock.  
The overall lesson that can be drawn from these studies is that the labour 
market is hugely affected by the financial market's dynamics and that there may 
be large employment-unemployment variations during economic recessions 
caused by financial crises.  
Turning to the findings on the youth unemployment rate during financial 
crises, the established literature finds that the impact of financial distress on the 
youth unemployment rate is larger than that on the adult unemployment rate.7 
This is because, in times of crisis, the structural problems characterising the 
transition from school to work are exacerbated.  For example, labour demand is 
typically lower, school-leavers compete with more jobseekers for fewer vacancies, 
                                                 
6 As for the performance of the “flexicurity system” in crisis time, see Auer (2010), Boeri et al. (2012), 
Jørgensen (2010), Lyhne Ibsen (2010); while Signorelli et al. (2012) invesigated the impact of financial crises 
on female labour. 
7
 The huge literature investigating the structural reasons determining, in several countries, a much higher youth 
unemployment rate with respect to adult rate is not considered here (for a survey, see Pastore, 2014); see also 
OECD (2005), Carmeci and Mauro (2003), Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012), Feldmann (2010), Caroleo and 
Pastore (2007), Quintini and Manfredi (2009) and Ryan (2001). 
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and unemployment may become structural. This may be the case in some 
Eurozone countries, which have been affected by a very long (and possibly 
double-dip) recession where young people are at risk of becoming a “lost 
generation” (Scarpetta et al. 2010).  Furthermore, O'Higgins (2011 and 2012) 
highlights that the key problem is not only that young people are more 
vulnerable to crises but also that these effects are likely to be more long-lasting 
for youngsters than for adults.8  Moreover, the size of the group of “youth left 
behind” is generally larger than the Youth Unemployment Rate indicates, and it 
can be proxied by the number of young people who are neither employed nor in 
education or training (NEETs) (O’Higgins, 2012; Scarpetta et al., 2010).  
 There are also papers that have sought to gain insights from studying the 
impact of past financial crises on unemployment.9  For example, Verick (2009), in 
order better to investigate the impact of the last crisis (especially on young men 
and women), analyses the effects on unemployment of the past “Big 5 Crises” 
(Spain 1977, Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 1991 and Japan 1992).  His 
analysis confirms that young people are hit the hardest and that the negative 
impact persists long after the economy has started growing again (hysteresis 
effect, see also Blanchard and Summers, 1987).  Finally, Choudhry et al. (2012) 
find that the impact of crises on the youth unemployment rate is significant and 
robust: youth unemployment increases until five years after a financial crisis, 
with the largest effects in the second and third years.  
 
3. Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy 
 We formulated the following hypotheses and we tested them via a 
longitudinal panel data analysis:  
1) labour market policies exert an impact on the level of (total and youth) 
unemployment in Europe, since ALMP (vis-à-vis PLMP) is more or less 
suitable for coping with external shocks in different countries; 
2) the country-specific severity of the crisis will be a determinant of the long-
lasting effect of the crises on (total and youth) unemployment; 
                                                 
8
 Long periods of unemployment erode the skills of young workers, reduce their employability, cause a 
permanent loss of human capital, and make unemployment persistent. 
9Signorelli et al. (2012) investigated the gender-specific effect of past financial crises. 
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3) the severity of the crisis will moderate the impact of the labour market 
policies (and conversely the labour market policies will moderate the impact of 
the severity of the crisis) on (total and youth) unemployment. 
  In our empirical exercise, we considered a wide range of labour market 
policies, at both the aggregate and disaggregated levels. Thus, following the work 
of Algan and Cahuc (2009), we were able to obtain some conclusive results on the 
dichotomy between "active" and "passive" labour market policies. In particular, 
we expected to find that, ceteris paribus, high expenditure on active labour 
market policies enhances labour productivity and will thus help to restrain 
unemployment increase in the case of adverse economic shocks. Conversely, high 
expenditure on passive labour market policies should increase the unemployment 
rate, and this is particularly true in the case of a crisis. This is because, as 
documented by Bruno and Rovelli (2010), in the presence of generous passive 
labour market policies, it is likely that a self-reinforcing and perverse cycle 
between moral hazard behaviour and scarce job search will arise.  
As in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell et al. (2005) and Bruno, and 
Rovelli (2010), we estimated a longitudinal panel model on the relationship 
between the unemployment rate10 and labour market policies by including a full 
set of country11 and year dummies. This was to ensure that the estimated 
coefficients on the labour market policy variables were not distorted by either 
time-invariant omitted variables at the country level or by common macro 
shocks.1213 
 
 
Formally, our estimable equations were: 
 
ittiitititit CrisisPolicyCrisisPolicyunrate ετµββββ ++++++= )*(3210   (1) 
 
                                                 
10
 Ideally, we could also analyse the impact of the very same independent variables on employment. However, 
our focus is the opportunity cost of being employed when policies for the unemployed are particularly 
generous: hence the focus on the latter - unemployed - instead of the former - employed. 
11
 Employment Protection Legislation, bargaining system etc. will be mainly accounted by these countries 
dummies, since these variables are typically very stable over time. 
12
 For a comparison see equation (1) page 19 and equation (2) page 25 in Blanchard Wolfers (2000). 
13
 We also ran some robustness checks for quadratic terms for both policies and the crisis instead of the 
interaction term, new and old member states and pre and post crises regressions. These results are available 
upon request. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these further robustness checks. 
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ittiitititit CrisisPolicyCrisisPolicyYunrate ετµββββ ++++++= )*(3210   (2) 
 
where ‘unrate’ is the unemployment rate, ‘Yunrate’ is the youth unemployment 
rate, ‘Policy’ stands for labour market policy, ‘Crisis’ represents the severity of 
the financial crisis, ‘Policy*Crisis’ is the interaction term between labour market 
policy and crisis severity and, finally µi and τt represent, respectively, the country 
and year dummies. 
 The indexes i and t stand for countries and years. It is thus immediately 
apparent that the variables which we employed were both country and time-
specific. This is an improvement with respect to previous studies, because it 
enabled us to evaluate the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to the 
aforementioned economic shocks by exploiting the variability in both the cross-
sectional and time dimensions.  
 Moreover, to be noted is that while the coefficients β1 and β2 account, 
respectively, for the direct impacts of labour market policies and the financial 
crisis (ceteris paribus) as in Hypothesis 1) and 2), β3 serves to evaluate the joint 
effect of policy and crisis as in Hypothesis 3). Thus, the overall effect of labour 
market policies (crisis) on unemployment was calculated considering both the 
estimated β1 (β2) and β3, where the estimated coefficients are indicated with a 
"hat" (i.e.
βˆ
henceforth).  
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 In our empirical exercise we considered a total of 30 countries, the 28 EU 
countries together with Norway and Island14, observed at yearly intervals in the 
period 1990-2012.15 
 Our dependent variables were the total and the youth unemployment 
rates. The former was defined as the number of people unemployed as a 
percentage of the labour force; where, following the definitions and 
recommendations of the International Labour Organisation, unemployed people 
are all persons 15 to 74 years of age (16 to 74 years in Spain, Italy and United 
                                                 
14
 The results were not affected by introduction of these two additional countries, which share some similar 
features with EU economies.  
15
 The panel was unbalanced due to some missing values; therefore the number of observations might change 
from one regression to another. 
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Kingdom) not employed during the reference week, had actively sought work 
during the past four weeks, and were ready to begin working immediately or 
within two weeks. The youth unemployment rate was similarly calculated 
considering only people of less than 25 years of age. Unemployment rates, both 
total and youth (see Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix), together with labour 
market policies and GDP data, were sourced from Eurostat, while we referred to 
Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2012) when assessing the initial year of the financial 
crisis for each country.  
Table 1 reports our main variables’ summary statistics.  It is important to 
note that in order to assess the impact of labour market policies on 
unemployment rates, we considered the opportunity cost of being employed with 
respect to being a beneficiary of a selected labour market policy. In particular, 
each of our ‘Policy’ variables was constructed as the country-year specific ratio of 
labour market policy entitlement per beneficiary (i.e. the amount of Euros spent 
on a selected labour market policy divided by the total number of beneficiaries) 
and the country-year specific GDP per capita, which proxies for the average wage 
rate. Thus, if the value of the Policy variable increases, it becomes more 
convenient to be a beneficiary of the labour market policy than to work; or put 
otherwise, the opportunity cost of being employed increases because the amount 
of money that the beneficiary loses, as incentives or subsidies, increases. As to its 
construction, the Policy variable was bounded between 0 and 1.  
 Moreover, we built an original indicator that accounted for the country and 
time-specific severity of the idiosyncratic financial crisis. In particular, crisis 
severity (i.e. variable “countrysev”) was calculated as the country-specific ratio of 
the number of quarters of negative GDP growth in one year to the total number 
of quarters of negative GDP growth experienced by the country in the period 
2008-2012.16 This variable was thus both country-specific and time varying. 
Moreover, by construction, the variable ranged from 0 to 1 along the crisis period 
(see Figure A3 in Appendix). We adopted the severity of the crisis variables 
instead of the crisis itself because we wanted to separate two different 
phenomena:, we envisaged capturing the timing of the crisis, on the one hand, 
and the strength of the crisis on the other. We proceeded in two steps. The timing 
                                                 
16
 2012 is usually considered to mark the end of the financial crises for the European countries, but it was also 
the last year available in our database. 
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of the crisis was drawn from the Laeven and Valencia 2010 database, meaning 
that the crisis variable started and ended in different years, depending on the 
country (see figure A3). This allowed the interaction term in the regressions to 
have an impact only starting (ending) in the relevant years for each country. This 
may be conceived as a pure crisis effect. However, there is not much variation 
across countries as far as the timing is concerned, and this is only part of the 
story. In fact we proceeded with a second step: each country was hit more or less 
at the same time by the crisis with different intensities. We therefore decided to 
re-name it ‘severity’ (number of negative growth quarters in the crisis time span 
over the total). The relevant question was whether this was sufficiently 
heterogeneous across countries to be justified. It turned out that it was (see 
figure A3), and so we trusted the use of this measure in the interaction term. 
 
Table 1: Average labour market policies benefits per person and average opportunity cost of 
being employed (yearly average in Euros €) 
Sampled 
Countries 
Total LMP 
per 
beneficiary 
€ 
Active 
LMP per 
beneficiary 
€ 
Passive 
LMP per 
beneficiary 
€ 
Total LMP 
opportunity 
cost % 
Active 
LMP 
opportunity 
cost % 
Passive 
LMP 
opportunity 
cost % 
        
Austria 12042.81 8642.584 12226.8 0.39 0.28 0.41 
Belgium 8608.096 7596.362 7805.754 0.28 0.25 0.28 
Bulgaria 1170.28 1320.13 925.4853 0.29 0.32 0.23 
Cyprus 8151.734 6100.496 8290.672 0.39 0.29 0.40 
Czech Rep. 3573.498 3303.156 2285.65 0.28 0.26 0.19 
Denmark 21167.81 19074.66 19200.6 0.52 0.53 0.52 
Estonia 2768.346 3914.914 2369.294 0.27 0.42 0.23 
Finland 10536.4 11768.82 9492.728 0.36 0.40 0.32 
France 10018.21 8229.614 9654.608 0.37 0.31 0.36 
Germany 11650.27 10850.74 10396.14 0.43 0.41 0.39 
Greece 5687.169 6849.936 3647.698 0.28 0.41 0.21 
Hungary 2666.413 2643.831 2251.465 0.29 0.28 0.25 
Ireland 11677.78 10612.66 8038.793 0.30 0.31 0.23 
Italy 7757.881 3697.116 11039.02 0.30 0.15 0.45 
Latvia 2208.418 2812.087 1817.521 0.29 0.37 0.23 
Lithuania 2720.967 2794.734 1848.841 0.33 0.36 0.22 
Luxembourg 16918.48 10828.85 22821.22 0.25 0.16 0.38 
Malta 2500.975 2708.01 2026.12 0.17 0.19 0.14 
Netherlands 15973.39 11366.28 13398.72 0.47 0.37 0.44 
Norway 20334.4 22374.9 17496.5 0.42 0.44 0.34 
Poland 2635.991 2281.093 2487.38 0.32 0.28 0.31 
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Portugal 5969.581 4373.695 5469.195 0.39 0.28 0.37 
Romania 1426.415 878.4591 1435.678 0.31 0.19 0.31 
Slovakia 2283.656 991.7724 3072.922 0.22 0.09 0.30 
Slovenia 5932.106 3674.272 6203.459 0.35 0.22 0.37 
Spain 5804.999 2321.41 9711.303 0.26 0.12 0.50 
Sweden 12115.88 13773.35 9118.254 0.37 0.42 0.29 
United 
Kingdom 
10006.73 10839.56 3934.773 0.33 0.37 0.14 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 Table 2 analyses the labour market policies in regard to their aggregates. 
Set out in Column 1 is the total amount of labour policies (expressed as the 
opportunity cost of being employed); in Column 2 only the aggregate for Active 
Labour Market Policies; and in Column 3 only the aggregate for passive labour 
market policies. Due to the fact that our regression controlled for common time 
shocks (among which the crisis itself) and time invariant countries effect, there is 
no significant result for the relative severity of crises per se (1st column).  
However, this result of “no impact” is present in the total Active Labour Market 
Policies, but not in the Passive ones.  In fact, the aggregate PLMP do have a 
significant impact on unemployment, as well as the relative crises and their 
interaction. In section 5.1 we propose a detailed interpretation of these results 
(section “Non-monotonous Effects” below). 
 
Table 2: Unemployment rate, Aggregate Policies and Crisis 
12 
 
Dependent variable: Total Unemployment
Total Labour Mkt Policies 3.05
(3.05)
Active Labour Mkt Policies 0.69
(1.54)
Passive Labour Mkt Policies 3.74*
(2.22)
Crisis -6.11 -2.69 -6.22**
(4.27) (2.12) (3.12)
Policy*Crisis 23.34* 14.42*** 22.39***
(12.69) (5.83) (9.19)
Dc: country dummies Y*** Y*** Y***
Dt: year dummies Y*** Y*** Y***
Observations: 237 278 302
F-stats  F(16,193)          =      6.14  F(16,234)          =      6.60  F(16,258)          =      7.71
 P-Value  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000
R-Square 0.3122 0.3109 0.3235
Hausman Test: FE vs RE Prob>chi2 =      0.0613 Prob>chi2 =      0.7728  Prob>chi2 =      0.6607  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically 
significant at 5% and *** statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 Table 3 goes into much greater detail and decomposes the labour market 
policies into nine sub-components (for definitions of the variables see Table A1 in 
the Appendix). Rehabilitation and start-up expenses are now significant. 
Consequently, these results give us a much richer picture of the relation among 
the unemployment rate, policies, and financial crises.   
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Table 3: Unemployment rate, Disaggregate Policies and Crisis 
 
 
Dependent variable: Total Unemployment
Training -0.41
(0.39)
Job Rotation 0.6
(0.6)
Employment Incentives 0.63
(0.52)
Rehabilitation 2.48***
(0 .78) 
Job Creation 0.88
(0.71)       
Start-up Incentives -0.43***
(0.15)
Early Retirement -0.68
(0.75)
Out of work and 
maintenance 3.52
(2.18)
Crisis 1.78 10.04** 0.17 5.13*** 0.57 1.51 -2.12 -5.4*
(2.21) (4.61) (1.53) (2) (1.76) (1.44) (4.15) (2.87)
Policy*Crisis -0.66 -19.8* 4.8 -8.25*** 2.74 -2.24 13.48 20.57**
(3.33) (10.67) (3.16) (3.4) (4.65) (1.5) (10.11) (8.56)
Dc: country dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***
Dt: year dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***
Observations: 280 102 275 207 246 189 166 304
F-stats   F(16,236) =  6.23  F(16,74)           =      3.35  F(16,232)          =      6.01  F(16,168)          =      5.80  F(16,204)          =      4.03  F(16,164)          =      4.63   F(16,134)          =      2.30  F(16,260)          =      7.59
 P-Value  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0002  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0051  Prob > F           =    0.0000
R-Square 0.2969 0.4201 0.2931 0.356 0.2401 0.3113 0.2155 0.3184
Hausman Test: FE vs RE  Prob>chi2 =      0.0008  Prob>chi2 =      0.0000  Prob>chi2 =      0.8318  Prob>chi2 =      0.8242  Prob>chi2 =      0.3316 Prob>chi2 =      0.0053 Prob>chi2 =      0.6920 Prob>chi2 =      0.6774  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically 
significant at 5% and *** statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 In Tables 4 and 5 we consider Youth Unemployment as the dependent 
variable, and we investigate the same relationships (see Equation 2). The results 
are qualitatively unchanged, but now the country-specific crisis effect is much 
more important.  
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Table 4: Youth Unemployment rate, Aggregate Policies and Crisis 
 
Dependent variable: Youth Unemployment
Total Labour Mkt Policies 2.55
(6.12)
Active Labour Mkt Policies 3.01
(3.08)
Passive Labour Mkt Policies 1.95
(4.56)
Crisis -10.77 -2.47 -10.4*
(8.56) (4.25) (6.4)
Policy*Crisis 47.78* 23.34** 43.94**
(25.43) (11.72) (18.84)
Dc: country dummies Y*** Y*** Y***
Dt: year dummies Y*** Y*** Y***
Observations: 237 278 302
F-stats  F(16,193)          =      7.66  F(16,234)          =      8.34  F(16,258)          =      9.67
 P-Value  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000
R-Square 0.3884 0.363 0.357
Hausman Test: FE vs RE  Prob>chi2 =      0.0007 Prob>chi2 =      0.4979 Prob>chi2 =      0.8317  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically 
significant at 5% and *** statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Table 5: Youth Unemployment rate, Disaggregate Policies and Crisis 
 
Dependent variable: Youth Unemployment
Training -0.32
(0.79)
Job Rotation 1.7
(1.22)
Employment Incentives 1.23
(1.05)
Rehabilitation 3.9**
(1.65) 
Job Creation 1.95
(1.41)     
Start-up Incentives -0.71**
(0.31)
Early Retirement -0.64
(1.49)
Out of work and maintenance
1.67
(4.46)
Crisis 5.11 24.1*** 1.61 12.21*** 3.71 4.02 -2.7 -8.89
(4.51) (9.33) (3.14) (4.32) (3.53) (3.1) (8.28) (5.87)
Policy*Crisis -2.15 -38.78* 9.07 -16.93** 0.94 -25.15 26.92 40.59**
(6.7) (21.57) (6.41) (7.23) (9.3) (19.2) (20.21) (17.54)
Dc: country dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***
Dt: year dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***
Observations: 280 102 275 207 246 189 166 304
F-stats F(16,236)          =      8.19  F(16,74)           =      4.24  F(16,232)          =      8.01   F(16,168)          =      6.83 F(16,204)          =      5.90 F(16,164)          =      5.80  F(16,134)          =      4.22    F(16,260)          =      9.58
 P-Value  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000  Prob > F           =    0.0000
R-Square 0.3571 0.4786 0.3558 0.3941 0.3162 0.3615 0.335 0.3708
Hausman Test: FE vs RE  Prob>chi2 =      0.0106  Prob>chi2 =      0.0000  Prob>chi2 =      0.9137  Prob>chi2 =      0.9504 Prob>chi2 =      0.2717  Prob>chi2 =      0.0383  Prob>chi2 =      0.7787 Prob>chi2 =      0.8495
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically 
significant at 5% and *** statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
5.1 Non-Monotonous Effects: accounting for Interactions 
 
 In order to investigate the joint effect on unemployment of the crisis and 
policy variables, we used an interaction effect in each and every regression. This 
joint impact turned out to be non-monotonous. In other words, the impact of the 
crisis on unemployment was positive, non-significantly different from zero, or 
negative depending on the actual value of the policy variable. By the same token, 
the impact of the policy variable of unemployment was positive, non-significantly 
different from zero, or negative depending on the crisis's values.  
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 More in detail, the joint effect of policies and crisis on unemployment was 
calculated in two steps. First, we retrieved the estimated thresholds for policies 
and crisis. Thus, we found the value of crisis (policy) such that the policy (crisis) 
variable had zero impact on unemployment. Second, we evaluated the joint 
impact of policies and crisis from below and above the thresholds and thus 
assessed their non-monotonous effects. The steps taken in order to calculate the 
non-monotonous effect of Policy for the given Crisis Threshold were the following:   
1) Finding the Crisis Threshold:  
As the total effect of Policy on Unemployment Rate is equal to: 
)*(ˆˆ 31 CrisisPolicyPolicy ββ + , the Crisis Threshold is such that: 
0)ˆˆ( 31 =+ CrisisPolicy ββ  or 0)ˆˆ( 31 =+ Crisisββ  
Thus, the Crisis Threshold= 3
1
ˆ
ˆ
β
β
−
        
2) Assessing the non-monotonous effects of Policy for the calculated Crisis 
Threshold: this was simply done by evaluating whether the variable Policy 
increased (decreased) the unemployment rate, for crisis values above (below) the 
Crisis Threshold.  
Likewise, the Policy Threshold was written as 3
2
ˆ
ˆ
β
β
−
 and the non-monotonous 
effect of the crisis was assessed by evaluating whether the variable Crisis 
increased (decreased) the unemployment rate, for policy values above (below) the 
Policy Threshold. The formal construction of these thresholds is shown in Tables 
6 and 7. Moreover, we provide a statistical interpretation in the following section 
5.2 by looking at Graphs 1 to 9. 
 
Table 6: Non-monotonous effects, total unemployment 
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Dependent variable: untot Statistical Significance Crisis Effect of Policy on unemployment rate Policy Effect of Crisis on unemployment rate
Threshold Threshold
Policy Crisis Interaction Crisis>Threshold Crisis<Threshold Policy>Threshold Policy<Threshold
ratio_totlmp_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. S* -0.130676949 u increases u decreases 0.2617823 u increases u decreases
ratio_almp_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. S*** -0.047595378 u increases u decreases 0.1867811 u increases u decreases
ratio_plmp_on_gdppc S* S** S*** -0.167115053 u increases u decreases 0.2775178 u increases u decreases
ratio_train2_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. -0.629662182 u decreases u increases 2.7124006 u decreases u increases
ratio_rot3_on_gdppc training N.S. S** S* 0.030103224 u decreases u increases 0.5073436 u decreases u increases
ratio_emplinc4_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. -0.13058368 u increases u decreases -0.034713 u increases u decreases
ratio_rehab5_on_gdppc S*** S*** S*** 0.301064886 u decreases u increases 0.623122 u decreases u increases
ratio_jobcr6_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. -0.322139012 u increases u decreases -0.208106 u decreases u increases
ratio_stup7_on_gdppc S*** N.S. N.S. -0.191964286 u decreases u increases 0.6741071 u decreases u increases
eret8_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. 0.05076157 u increases u decreases 0.1569253 u increases u decreases
ratio_outwork9_on_gdppc N.S. S* S** -0.171064037 u increases u decreases 0.2624989 u increases u decreases
 
 
Table 7: Non-monotonous effects, Youth unemployment  
Dependent variable: youthun Statistical Significance Crisis Effect of Policy on unemployment rate Policy Effect of Crisis on unemployment rate
Threshold Threshold
Policy Crisis Interaction Crisis>Threshold Crisis<Threshold Policy>Threshold Policy<Threshold
ratio_totlmp_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. S* -0.053369611 u increases u decreases 0.2254081 u increases u decreases
ratio_almp_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. S** -0.128947111 u increases u decreases 0.1057561 u increases u decreases
ratio_plmp_on_gdppc N.S. S* S** -0.04444604 u increases u decreases 0.2367152 u increases u decreases
ratio_train2_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. -0.150830285 u decreases u increases 2.3746861 u decreases u increases
ratio_rot3_on_gdppc training N.S. S*** S* 0.043737785 u decreases u increases 0.6206122 u decreases u increases
ratio_emplinc4_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. -0.136178183 u increases u decreases -0.177807 u increases u decreases
ratio_rehab5_on_gdppc S** S*** S** 0.230278922 u decreases u increases 0.7214596 u decreases u increases
ratio_jobcr6_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. -2.08071527 u decreases u increases -3.955298 u increases u decreases
ratio_stup7_on_gdppc S** N.S. N.S. -0.028230616 u decreases u increases 0.159841 u decreases u increases
eret8_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. N.S. 0.023854445 u increases u decreases 0.1005967 u increases u decreases
ratio_outwork9_on_gdppc N.S. N.S. S** -0.041304753 u increases u decreases 0.2191773 u increases u decreases
 
 
 
5.2 Non-Monotonous Effects: Confidence Intervals of the interaction effects17 
 
Following Brambor et al. 2006, we now turn to detailed description of the 
statistical relevance and the marginal effects of the interaction terms stemming 
from our analyses. In the following graphs 1 to 5 (each composed of two panels) 
we show the marginal effect of the policy on the unemployment rate (∂U/∂policy) 
conditional on the crises, as well as the marginal effect of the crisis (∂U/∂crisis) 
                                                 
17
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the interpretation of the marginal effects of interaction terms 
and their relevant statistical significance. 
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conditional on the policies. In the same way we explore the marginal effects on 
Youth Unemployment in graphs 6 to 9 (∂YU/∂policy & ∂YU/∂crisis).  
In other words, graphs 1 to 9 depict the joint effect of policies and crisis severity 
on the unemployment rate (or youth). The graphs can be read as follows. The 
blue line represents the linear marginal effect. The 95% confidence intervals are 
the lower bound (LB) red lines and the upper bound (UB) green ones. When both 
confidence intervals lie above (or below) the zero effect line, we can assess that 
there is a statically significant effect of the policy (or the crisis) on 
unemployment. If in the same graphs the confidence interval switches from 
above to below, then there is a statistically significant non-monotonous effect. We 
should also recall that both the policy and the crisis variables are constructed on 
a (0,1) scale. Let us analyse them in order. 
  
Graph 1: Tot unemployment rate: Total Passive Labour Market Policies (panel A) 
and the Crisis Joint Effect (panel B) 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
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Both passive labour market policies and the crisis impact with a positive sign on 
unemployment, i.e. the more generous the policies and the more serious the 
crisis, the higher the unemployment rate. However, the crisis seems to work as a 
disciplining device whenever the level of the policy (opportunity cost of being 
employed) is below 9% of the average wage, i.e. below the point at which the 
upper bound of the CI hits the zero effect line. In other words, moderate levels of 
passive labour market policies may enhance a reduction of unemployment during 
a crisis, which is policy relevant. 
 
Graph 2: Total unemployment Rate: Rotation Policies (panel A) and the Crisis 
(panel B) Joint Effect  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
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Rotation policies do not exert a marginal effect on unemployment. However, 
when the policies are below 20%, the crisis has a positive impact on 
unemployment. We can interpret these results as a smoothing effect of rotation 
policies on the crisis’s detrimental impact. The crisis is less unemployment 
conducive whenever the rotation-policies are relative higher.  
  
Graph 3: Total unemployment Rate: Rehabilitation Policies (panel A) and the 
Crisis (panel B) Joint effect 
Panel A 
  
Panel B 
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Rehabilitation policies register a genuine non-monotonous effect: when the crisis 
is less then 0.17% severe, they tend to increase unemployment; vice-versa when 
the crisis is extremely severe (more than 85%) they tend to reduce 
unemployment. Similarly to the rotation policies, we can also assess that the 
crisis makes unemployment higher whenever the policies are below 33%. 
 
Graph 4: Total unemployment Rate: Start-up Policies (panel A) and the Crisis 
(panel B) Joint effect 
Panel A 
  
 
Panel B 
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On a different note, start-up and crisis do not interact at all on unemployment, 
and this is highlighted by the very wide CI around the zero effect line. 
 
Graph 5: Total unemployment Rate: Out of Work Policies (panel A) and the Crisis 
(panel B) Joint effect 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
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Out of labour force policies induce higher unemployment, and this effect is 
amplified by the crisis. By the same token, the crisis has an amplified effect when 
out of labour polices are excessively generous (above 40%). 
 
Graph 6: Youth unemployment rate: Total Passive Labour Market Policies (panel 
A) and the Crises (panel B) Joint Effect  
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
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Total passive labour market policies are detrimental for the youth labour market 
when they are too generous, i.e. the worse the crisis (above 13%) the higher the 
positive effect on unemployment. Conversely, the crisis is conducive to higher 
unemployment when the policies are more than 35%. 
 
Graph 7: Youth unemployment rate: Rotation Policies (panel A) and the Crisis 
(panel B) Joint Effect  
Panel A 
 
 
 
Panel B 
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As regards rotation policies, we find a similar result to that for overall 
unemployment: no independent impact on youth unemployment but a mitigating 
effect with respect to the crisis’s marginal effect. Below 29%, the crisis hits the 
labour market, above 29% it does not. 
 
Graph 8: Youth unemployment rate: Rehabilitation Policies (panel A) and the 
Crisis (panel B) Joint Effect  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
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A genuine non-monotonous effect also appears for rehabilitation: for low levels of 
the crisis (in normal times) it seems to increase unemployment, but for a very 
severe crisis period it has the opposite effect. Again, the crisis hits unemployment 
positively for a value of the policies below 45% but then it fades away. 
 
Graph 9: Youth unemployment rate: Start Up Policies (panel A) and the Crisis 
(Panel B) Joint Effect  
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
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 Finally, Start-up policies have no relevant and significant results on youth 
unemployment. 
 To sum up, we can comfortably conclude that all three testable hypotheses 
have been confirmed, but the impact of each and every policy is substantially 
different when interacted with the crisis – which in general exerts a positive 
impact on unemployment, as one would expect. We discuss these concluding 
results in the next section.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 The aim of this paper has been to fill the gap in the literature concerning 
the complex joint impact of labour market policies and financial crises on labour 
market outcomes. In particular, we have addressed this research question by 
applying an innovative empirical approach to 30 European countries over the 
past two decades and considering the effects of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
which is associated with the “Great Recession”. More in detail, we have measured 
labour market policies in terms of the opportunity cost of being employed instead 
of being a labour market policy beneficiary, and we have constructed a country-
specific and time-varying variable accounting for the idiosyncratic-severity effect 
of the last crisis. This pair of variables has enabled us to test the joint impact of 
labour market policies and economic crises on (total and youth) unemployment, 
exploiting the variability in both the cross-sectional and time dimension. 
Operationally, we began by looking at an empirical specification able to 
disentangle the effect of the crisis on (total and youth) unemployment from the 
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effect of labour market policies. This first step was instrumental in analysing the 
direct effect of these two separate components (crisis vs. policies) in the enlarged 
European context. In fact, we were interested in the combined effect of crisis and 
policies as our overall research question. As far as the interaction effect is 
concerned, our main findings are the following: passive labour market policies, 
ideally targeted on reducing the effects of  crises by guaranteeing generous 
unemployment benefits, turn out to be detrimental in times of crisis, whereas 
they may be good policy instruments if they are not too generous; specific types of 
active labour market policies, such as rehabilitation and training incentives, are 
to be preferred in times of crisis because they may reduce unemployment more 
rapidly. Finally, young people should be targeted with special policies because 
they are particularly vulnerable to crises. Policy makers might therefore look at 
the complex joint effect of policies and crisis in order to design better general as 
well as specific, traditional as well as innovative, economic and labour policies. 
 Being aware of the specific nature of these results, we envisage further 
research18 on the channels through which economic crises and the labour market 
policies and institutions interplay in determining short and long run labour 
market performance. This is of key importance for any economist, decision maker 
or scholar working on the determinants of better and more jobs in the current 
European context characterised - especially in some countries - by a high risk of 
long stagnation without net job creation, i.e. with persistently high total and 
youth unemployment rates, after some years of more or less dramatic economic 
recession. 
 
                                                 
18
 For example by looking at the impact of the macroeconomic policies in times of crisis and/or by distinguishing 
Old vs. New EU member states. 
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Figure A1: Unemployment rate by Country, all population 
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Figure A2: Youth Unemployment rate by Country 
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Figure A3: Crisis Severity by Country 
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Table A1: Detailed Variables Description 
Name of the Variable Description Source 
GDP      
gdp GDP at market prices, millions of 
Euros (ECU until 1998) 
Eurostat, Quarterly National 
Accounts 
gdppc GDP per inhabitant in Euros at 
current market prices 
Eurostat, National Accounts 
and GDP 
quarterly_gdp Quarterly GDP at current market 
prices, seasonally adjusted 
Eurostat, National Accounts 
and GDP 
Unemployment     
Total Unemployment Unemployment rate, all population Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
Youth Unemployment Unemployment rate of people aged 
under 25, % of total labour force 
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
Labour Market Policies (LMP)     
totlmp Labour market policy public 
expenditure in % of GDP  
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
almp active lmp, total, in % GDP Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
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plmp passive lmp, total, in % GDP Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
train2 active lmp, training; Millions of 
Euros and annual stock (i.e. average 
people involved) 
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
rot3 active lmp, job rotation and job 
sharing, Millions of Euros and 
annual stock (i.e. average people 
involved) 
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
emplinc4 active lmp, employment incentives; 
Millions of Euros and annual stock 
(i.e. average people involved) 
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
rehab5 active lmp, supported employment 
and rehabilitation; Millions of Euros 
and annual stock  
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
jobcr6 active lmp, direct job creation; 
Millions of Euros and annual stock 
(i.e. average people involved) 
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
stup7 active lmp, start-up incentives; 
Millions Euro and annual stock (i.e. 
average people involved) 
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
eret8 passive lmp, early retirement; 
Millions of Euros and annual stock 
(i.e. average people involved) 
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
outwork9 passive lmp, out of work and 
maintenance; Millions of Euros and 
annual stock  
Eurostat, Labour Market 
Statistics 
Opportunity cost of being employed   
Total LMP opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. average totlmp beneficiary: 
(totlmp in Euro/totlmp 
beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Active LMP opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. average almp beneficiary: (almp 
in Euro/almp beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Passive LMP opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. average plmp beneficiary: (almp 
in Euro/plmp beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Training opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. training beneficiary: (train2 in 
Euro/train2 beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
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Job Rotation opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. training beneficiary: (rot3 in 
Euro/rot3 beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Employment Incentives opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. employment 
beneficiary:(emplinc4 in 
Euro/emplinc4 beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Rehabilitation opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. rehabilitation beneficiary: 
(rehab5 in Euro/rehab5 
beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Job Creation opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. job creation beneficiary: (jobcr6 
in Euro/jobcr6 beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Start-up Incentives opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. start-up beneficiary: (stup7 in 
Euro/stup7 beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Early Retirement opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. early retirement beneficiary: 
(eret8 in Euro/eret8 
beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Out of work and maintenance opportunity cost of being employed 
vs. out of work beneficiary: 
(outwork9 in Euro/outwork9 
beneficiaries)/gdppc 
own calculations 
Crisis     
bc2008 banking crisis started in 2008  Laeven and Valencia (2010, 
2012) 
bc2007 banking crisis started in 2007  Laeven and Valencia (2010, 
2012) 
qdrops country and year specific number of 
quarters of negative GDP growth, 
from crisis beginning  
own calculations 
countrydrops country specific total number of 
qdrops between 2008-2012 
own calculations 
Crisis country-year specific severity of the 
crisis: qdrops/countrydrops 
own calculations 
Interaction Terms     
Policy*Crisis opportunity cost of being 
employed* crisis, e.g. 
ratio_totlmp_on_gdppc*countrysev 
own calculations, one policy 
specific interaction term for 
each of the listed labour 
market policies has been 
calculated  
 
